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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a district court poured over to the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to UCA § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues are those raised by plaintiff/ appellant with the addition that 
the appeal is frivolous. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Various motions for summary judgment and other things were scheduled 
for hearing at the final pretrial conference. Argument and decision on the 
plaintiff/appellant's motion for partial summary judgment were delayed by 
stipulation until after the jury was out. 
Statement of Facts 
The facts alleged by the plaintiff were contested. For purposes of the 
summary judgment motion defendant/appellee filed an extensive affidavit 
controverting the allegations of plaintiffs attorneys. The affidavit is found at 
page 416 of the record. It is reproduced here from the memorandum in 
opposition which is found in the record at page 423 and 425. It in essential form 
restates the affidavit and reflects what the court was presented with by way of 
controverting the plaintiffs claims that there were material uncontested facts. 
The facts alleged in appellant's brief bear little resemblance to the case that was 
tried. The jury found the facts against the plaintiff and essentially as stated by 
the defendant. 
1. Hughes was contacted by phone in St. Louis, Missouri by Maxine 
Archuleta on or about October 19,1993 requesting that he represent her in a 
potential claim for injuries suffered in an automobile accident. Ron Bennett and 
the plaintiff were on the phone when defendant answered. 
2. Before contacting Hughes, Maxine Archuleta claims to have been 
referred to Ron Bennett, a licensed public adjuster by her friend Vsana Skinner. 
She claims, " ...Vsana skinner referred me—you know, she contacted Ron about 
the accident I was in. Irene knows Ron. Q. That's Irene Roche? A. Yes, and 
Archuleta deposition at page 65. Plaintiff sought out Don Hughes to retain him. 
3. Maxine Archuleta executed the retainer agreement attached hereto as 
Exhibit A on October 23,1993 in the presence of Ron Bennett. 
4. Maxine Archuleta's initial medical bills totaling $618 were submitted to 
Allstate Insurance as PIP carrier. Allstate paid these initial bills. See drafts 
attached to the deposition of Sandra Mcintosh. Maxine Archuleta handled the 
routine submission of these bills herself. See application for PIP benefits attached 
to deposition of Sandra Mcintosh. No attorney's fee was taken by Hughes on 
any of the routinely submitted bills. See affidavit of Don Hughes and application 
for PIP benefits attached to the deposition of Sandra Mcintosh. 
5. On November 17,1993 Maxine Archuleta had an MRI. The results 
were: "Discs appear essentially unremarkable at all levels. There may be a 
minuscule annular bulge at C3-4 but no evidence of herniation extruded 
fragment or foraminal compromise. Cord intrinsically normal without evidence 
of mass, syninx, etc. No evidence of congenital or acquired spinal stenosis. 
IMPRESSION: ESSENTIALLY NORMAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE SCAN, 
CERVICAL SPINE WITH ABOVE OBSERVATIONS." (emphasis in original) See 
report attached to the deposition of Sandra Mcintosh. 
6. On January 7,1994 Sandra Mcintosh as claim representative of Allstate 
Insurance PIP benefits sent a letter to Maxine Archuleta's physician questioning 
why Allstate should pay the MRI bill when she could find "nothing in your 
records which identify clinical symptoms such as parathesias or radiculopathy 
suggesting nerve impingement/' See letter of Mcintosh attached to her 
deposition. 
7. The response was that Maxine Archuleta had complained of severe 
back pain from her neck to her tail bone on October 21,1993. By November 15, 
1993 the symptoms had mostly resolved except pain going down into her 
shoulders and persistent neck pain. Even though the objective observations 
showed the pain to be localized her physician was unable to observe any signs of 
acute disease he did not want to miss something if there was radicular pain. The 
negative MRI gave him a basis for encouraging Maxine Archuleta to resume her 
regular work load and continue physical therapy. "I felt the results aided me in 
encouraging her to get back to work at an earlier time and to continue with 
physical therapy." See letter of January 12,1994 attached to deposition of Sandra 
Mcintosh. 
8. Maxine Archuleta continued physical therapy only until the $3,000 
threshold was reached. Maxine Archuleta did not want to continue medical 
treatment. See Archuleta deposition pages 50 to 52. Maxine Archuleta has not 
been back to see any physician or therapist of any kind for her back problems 
since terminating physical therapy. See Archuleta deposition at page 55. 
9. Other than possibly missing 3 or 4 days immediately after the accident 
and occasionally leaving work early to make physical therapy appointments 
Maxine Archuleta did not miss any work because of her accident. See Archuleta 
deposition page 53. 
10. Maxine Archuleta refused to go to physical therapy or to receive any 
further treatment after her medical bills exceeded the $3,000 threshold. See 
Archuleta deposition pages 48 to 55. 
11. Maxine Archuleta does not claim to have any evidence that she was 
permanently injured in the car accident. Her physician told her she suffered a 
strain and that was all. Archuleta deposition at pages 40 and 41. 
12. It was Hughes opinion that a fair settlement for the injury suffered by 
Maxine Archuleta would be in the $5,000 range. See Hughes affidavit and 
Hughes deposition page 104. 
13. Hughes engaged Ron Bennett, a licensed public adjuster to carry out 
the initial negotiations with Allstate Insurance. Hughes was aware of Bennett's 
skill as an accident investigator and his abilities in dealing with insurance 
personnel. Hughes was personally aware of the excellent job Bennett had done 
on other occasions for Hughes and for other attorneys including plaintiffs 
counsel, Dan Wilson. Hughes conveyed to Bennett his assessment of the case 
and instructions in how to proceed with the negotiations. The offer received 
from Allstate was higher than the value placed on the case by Hughes. 
14. Hughes was of the opinion that the higher offer was due in part to 
Bennett's relationship with Allstate personnel and in part that Allstate did not 
know the lack of plaintiffs evidence demonstrating positive injury. 
15. The use of a skilled public adjuster or paralegal is consistent with the 
standard of practice in Weber County. Hughes had previously used Bennett in 
this manner and is aware of other attorneys engaging Bennett in the same 
function, including plaintiffs counsel, Dan Wilson. Hughes maintained 
responsible control over all aspects of the case and delivered a fair and 
reasonable result for Maxine Archuleta See affidavit of Hughes. 
16. The settlement received from Allstate as liability carrier consisted of 
$9,286 in new money and payment to the PIP carrier (Allstate) of $618 in 
subrogation rights. See draft attached to deposition of Maxine Archuleta and 
draft attached to deposition of Sandra Mcintosh. 
17. Maxine Archuleta was given a written accounting of the funds at the 
time she executed the release. See affidavit of Don Hughes. 
18. Maxine Archuleta had medical bills that did not relate in any way to 
the accident, including medical bills for her children. Maxine Archuleta 
requested that she receive $5,000 of the funds and that Hughes attempt to 
compromise the hospital bills for herself and her children with the balance of the 
funds. Maxine Archuleta was informed that she was responsible for her medical 
bills and would have to pay any that were not compromised or exceeded the 
amount retained in trust. 
19. In July of 1994 Maxine Archuleta asked Hughes to no longer try to 
resolve her medical bills and asked for the return of the funds being held in trust. 
The funds were returned to her. See deposition of Hughes. 
20. Don Hughes graduated from the charter class of the J. Rueben Clark 
Law School at Brigham Young University. He was admitted to the Utah Bar in 
April of 1976. In the course of following years Hughes has represented hundreds 
of clients including many personal injury cases. Hughes is familiar with the 
standard of practice in Weber and Davis Counties through his nearly two 
decades of practice. 
21. A contingent fee agreement of 1/3 of any settlement, compromise or 
judgment is fair and comports with the standard of practice of attorneys in the 
second judicial district. The retainer agreement between Hughes and Archuleta 
is fair and reasonable and comports with the standards of conduct generally 
prevailing in the second judicial district. Defendant did not inflate his attorney's 
fee. 
22. Hughes represented Maxine Archuleta in a manner consistent with 
the standards of practice current in Weber and Davis Counties. Don Hughes 
achieved a fair and reasonable settlement for Maxine Archuleta. Maxine 
Archuleta received positive gain from the representation of Don Hughes and 
suffered no damage. Maxine Archuleta was fairly and adequately compensated 
for her injuries. See affidavit of Don Hughes. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The position of defendant/appellee is that he well represented Maxine 
Archuleta that that she recovered a fair and reasonable settlement for her real 
injuries related to the accident. 
1. Three of appellant's claims are for the court's refusal to grant partial summary 
judgment. For purposes of summary judgment the facts are viewed in a light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
2. Three of appellant's points are essentially the same and seek a ruling that an 
attorney cannot take a fee on uncontested pip benefits. The flaw in the 
argument is that no fee was collected on any pip benefits in this case. 
a. Appellant's first issue. This isn't a lien case. It is a case in which plaintiff's 
law suit was settled and plaintiff authorized the settlement. It was never 
disputed that she understood she was agreeing to a contingent fee of 1/3. Her 
foremost claim at trial was that her case was worth more. The jury disagreed 
and that issue is not on appeal. Plaintiff's claim is that the agreement did not 
authorize the payment of a fee for PIP benefits. The problem plaintiff/appellant 
has is no fee was ever taken on PIP benefits. 
b. Appellant's second issue. Plaintiff/ Appellant still argues that Hughes 
should not be allowed to receive $800 for PIP benefits. Whether the law allows 
attorneys to collect fees for such services is irrelevant because none was collected 
by Hughes on any PIP benefits. The undisputed amount of benefits paid under 
PIP was $618 and Maxine Archuleta received all of that. 
c. Appellant's fifth issue. This point in appellant's brief is a recitation of the 
same misstatement of fact asserting that Hughes took a fee of $800 on PIP 
benefits. I don't know how many times it needs to be said no such fee was 
collected. The medical necessity of the bills was questioned by the PIP and none 
after the $618 were paid. The liability case settled at about the same time as 
Maxine Archuleta's physician was responding to the inquiry for justification of 
an MRL 
3. Plaintiffs third issue is the refusal to give an instruction on agency. Agency 
was not an issue at trial. There was nothing done in representation that Hughes 
did not claim to have either done or directly supervised. 
4. The court properly refused to allow plaintiff/ appellant to audit Hughes trust 
account. There was no issue in this trial that required Hughes to divulge the 
confidential information of his clients. Plaintiff admitted that she received all 
trust funds promptly on her terminating the attorney client relation. 
5. This is a frivolous appeal that should not have been brought. The entire 
remaining claim of plaintiff subject to this appeal is $800. It certainly points to 
other purposes as to why this case is still being pursued. 
APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THREE OF APPELLANT'S CLAIMS ARE FOR THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO 
GRANT PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The timing of the summary judgment hearing is somewhat unusual. The 
motions for summary judgment were not scheduled until the final pretrial 
conference days before the commencement of trial. The parties stipulated that 
arguments would take place after the jury was out. The jury returned a verdict 
of non suit against the plaintiff/appellant before the arguments could be heard. 
The actual arguments took place after conclusion of the trial and the return of the 
verdict. All of the issues presented in plaintiffs motion for partial summary 
judgment were litigated at trial and found wanting by the jury. 
Hughes as defendant filed with the court a lengthy affidavit in support of 
his opposition to the motion for partial summary judgment. See affidavit at page 
416 of the record. The affidavit contested virtually every fact claimed by the 
plaintiff/appellant. There were no uncontested facts in plaintiffs motion for 
partial summary judgment. 
Summary judgment is only appropriate if there are no undisputed 
material issues of fact. On summary judgment the facts are interpreted in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Sandy City v Salt Lake City, 827 
P2d 212 (Utah 1992); Rollins v Petersen, 813 P2d 1156 (Utah 1991); Rutherford v 
AT&T Communications of Mountain States, 844 P2d 949 (Utah 1992). In the context 
of claims against attorneys the same rule applies and the facts are also viewed in 
favor of the non-moving party. "It is only necessary for the non-moving party to 
show 'facts' controverting the 'facts' asserted by the moving party." Breuer-
Harrison v Combe, 799 P2d 727, 728 (Utah App 1990). In this case Hughes 
submitted a long and detailed statement of the case controverting virtually every 
fact claimed by the plaintiff/appellant. In the context of the motion for partial 
summary judgment there were no uncontested facts. The strange twist in this 
case is that the jury as finder of fact had at the time the judge was ruling on the 
motion, had heard the fully litigated case and had found that plaintiffs 
evidence lacking and not credible. How could anyone say the 
plaintiff/appellant had presented uncontested facts. 
POINT TWO 
THREE OF APPELLANT'S POINTS ARE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AND 
SEEK A RULING THAT AN ATTORNEY CANNOT TAKE A FEE ON 
UNCONTESTED PIP BENEFITS. THE FLAW IN THE ARGUMENT IS THAT 
NO FEE WAS COLLECTED ON ANY PIP BENEFITS IN THIS CASE. 
Three of plaintiff/appellant relate to the court's denial of partial summary 
judgment and all three relate directly to the assertion that an attorney should not 
take a fee on uncontested PIP benefits. These issues on plaintiff/appellant/s 
motion for partial summary judgment are dealt with together because of their 
similarity. The issues raised by appellant bear little resemblance to the case that 
was tried and less relation to the facts as testified to by the witnesses including 
Maxine Archuleta. 
The first, second and fifth issues raised on appeal by appellant are each 
different ways of stating the same claim that an attorney is not entitled to a fee 
on undisputed PIP benefits. None of these issues apply to this case. Regardless 
of whether there are circumstances in which an attorney can charge a fee for 
collecting PIP benefits the issue doesn't apply in this case. NO FEE WAS 
TAKEN ON ANY PIP BENEFITS, CONTESTED OR OTHERWISE. See 
paragraph four of appellee's affidavit at Page 416 of the record. 
The general rule is that negligence cases are not subject to summary 
judgment. Preston v Lamb 436 P2d 1021 (Utah 1068). This applies to attorney 
negligence as well. Jackson v Dabney, 645 P2d 615 (Utah 1982). The standard of 
care and question of breach are fact questions for the jury on receipt of proper 
expert opinion. Jackson, supra; Brown v Small 825 P2d 1209 (Mont 1992). 
A. Appellant's first issue. 
The first issue is the claim the retainer agreement did not retain Hughes to 
settle claims against her own insurance company. The appellant completely 
misconstrues the facts. Allstate Insurance was both the PIP carrier for Maxine 
Archuleta and the liability carrier for the woman that ran into her. See 
paragraph 16 of the affidavit of Appellee at page 416 of the record. There was 
no settlement with the PIP carrier. The settlement was with Allstate as the 
liability carrier. See previous citation to record. 
The initial medical bills were submitted to Allstate as the PIP carrier by 
Maxine Archuleta on forms prepared in Hughes office without charge by 
Hughes. Allstate as the PIP carrier paid $618 to Archuleta and settled her 
property damage claim, all without Hughes taking a fee. 
Separate adjusters represented Allstate on the PIP claim and on the 
liability claim. The PIP adjuster questioned the medical necessity of an MRI and 
requested explanation why appellants physician had ordered the MRI. The bill 
was never paid by the PIP claim. The liability claim settled before the PIP 
adjuster resolved her concerns or paid any bills. See paragraph 6 of affidavit at 
page 416 of the record. At trial of this issue Archuleta could not prove that she 
had $3,000 in medical bills related to the accident to reach the threshold for filing 
a suit. She admitted that she had subsequently injured her knee and had 
additional problems not related to the accident. 
Maxine Archuleta has never claimed that Hughes ever told her or 
represented to her the contingent fee to be anything other than 1/3 of the 
recovery. She has not claimed that her understanding was otherwise. In none of 
the documents supporting her motion for partial summary judgment on this 
issue is there reference to her understanding being otherwise. The settlement of 
this case was with the liability carrier of the woman that ran into her. 
Coincidentally that carrier also happened to be Allstate her own carrier. The 
attorneys for the plaintiff/appellant intentionally confuse the difference just as 
they tried to do at trial. Allstate was required to maintain a "China Wall" 
between the two adjusters. In this case they did this. The settlement was with 
the liability carrier for new money and the reimbursement of the PIP carrier for 
benefits paid. 
For plaintiff/appellant to have prevailed on her motion for partial 
summary judgment she would have had to demonstrate that the standard of care 
for attorneys is that collection of PIP benefits is violated per se and constitutes 
malpractice. She would then have to demonstrate that she had medical bills that 
would have qualified for PIP benefits and that they were uncontested. The basic 
elements of attorney malpractice important to this case are 1) the standard of care 
of attorneys, 2) whether the standard was breached and 3) did the breach 
proximately result in damages. Harline v Barker 854 P2d 595,598 (Utah App 
1993). 
In the supporting documents for the motion for partial summary 
judgment there is no expert opinion proffered. The only expert opinion offered 
is that of defendant/appellee to the effect that his actions in this case were within 
the standard of care required of attorneys in the Second Judicial District. 
There was also no demonstration that she had incurred any additional 
medical bills related to the accident that would have qualified for PIP payments. 
At trial this issue was fully litigated and Maxine Archuleta admitted she could 
not show even sufficient medical bills related to the accident to meet the $3,000 
threshold. When she incurred a total of $3,000 in medical bills for all reasons she 
quit going for treatment and has refused to go since. See affidavit at Page 416 of 
the record. 
B. Appellant's second issue. 
The second claim is virtually a restatement of the first, namely that 
Hughes would not be entitled to a fee on the routine collection of PIP benefits. 
The undisputed fact in the documents presented by appellant in support of her 
motion for summary judgment make no claim Hughes collected a fee on any PIP 
benefits. At trial plaintiff/appellant admitted that Hughes did not take a fee on 
any PIP benefits. At trial her claim changed to one of saying that Hughes should 
have submitted and pursued her PIP claims for her without fee even if they were 
contested. 
Maxine Archuleta submitted her own PIP claim with supporting forms 
from Hughes office. Archuleta submitted and settled her own property damage 
claim. Hughes took no fee on any of those funds. Maxine Archuleta ran into a 
dead end on PIP payments. Her PIP benefits were not routine. They were not 
uncontested and they were not paid. Hughes did not collect them nor did he 
take a fee on any that were collected. 
This is a legal malpractice case. It is a claim that the performance of the 
Appellee fell below the standard of practice of attorneys similarly situated. Even 
if Hughes had taken a fee on PIP benefits Appellant offered no expert opinion 
with her that collection of PIP benefits is malpractice. 
The necessary elements of a claim against an attorney are well established 
in Utah law. The Court of Appeals in Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v Combe 799 P2d 716, 
727 (Utah 1990) says, "Once this [attorney client] relationship is proven, the client 
has the burden of showing two additional elements: 1) negligence on the part of 
the attorney, and 2) that such negligence was the proximate cause of damage to 
the client/7 The court cites Dunn v McKay Burton and Thurman, 584 P2d 894,896 
(Utah 1978) as authority for this statement. 
"The elements of legal malpractice include: (1) an attorney-client 
relationship; (2) a duty of the attorney to the client; (3) a breach of that duty; and 
(4) damages suffered by the client proximately caused by the attorney's breach of 
duty." Harline v Barker 854 P2d 595,598 (Utah App 1993). 
Whether an attorney breached the standard of care is an issue of fact. " A 
genuine issue of fact exists where, on the facts in the record, reasonable minds 
could differ on whether defendant's conduct measures up to the required 
standard." Jackson v Dabney, 645 P2d 615 (Utah 1982). 
The standard of care is determined by expert testimony. Utah, as virtually 
every jurisdiction requires the standard of professional care be proven by expert 
testimony. The standard of care is a question of fact to be determined through 
expert testimony. Kellas v Sawilosky, 322 SE2d 897 (GA1984); Gruse v Belline 486 
NE2d 398 (1985); Brown v Small 825 P2d 1209 (Mont 1992); Boigegrain v Gilbert, 
784 P2d 849 (Colo App 1989); Somma v Gracey 544 A2d 668 (1988). 
After the standard of care is proven the plaintiff must prove the defendant 
breached the standard and that there are damages proximately caused by the 
breach of the standard. This is the trial within a trial referenced supra. 
"Proximate cause is an issue of fact/' Harline supra at 600. See also Swift Stop, Inc. 
v Wight, 845 P2d 250, 253 (Utah App 1992). 
These are the legal doctrines enunciated by the Utah appellate courts 
applying to claims against attorneys. None of this body of law is cited by the 
plaintiff. The requirements of proving a duty and the applicable standard of care 
is for expert opinion. In this particular case the reasons for expert testimony 
apply. The claimed breach is not simple such as a missed statute of limitations 
but relates to "constructive" duties asserted by plaintiffs counsel. Evaluation of 
the standard of care requires the assistance of expert witnesses. 
C. Plaintiff/Appellant's fifth issue. 
It is claimed that, "as a matter of law, Hughes constructively defrauded 
Archuleta when he charged her an illegal and unreasonable contingent fee for 
collecting undisputed PIP benefits." (Point V of appellant's brief) It should be 
noted that the plaintiff/appellant admitted that there was no evidence of actual 
fraud. It should also be noted that there is no claim that Hughes took a fee on 
any PIP benefit. No fee was collected on PIP benefits. 
There was no evidence in any of the documents supporting the motion for 
partial summary judgment that Maxine Archuleta had any medical bills beyond 
the $618 that ere paid that qualified for payment by PIP benefits. 
Plaintiff/Appellant offered no evidence from any medical provider to even 
suggest that any of the medical bills either related to the accident or were 
medically necessary because of the accident. The affidavit of Hughes contesting 
the partial summary judgment certainly controverts the claim and requires the 
trier of fact to determine the facts. See paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of the affidavit at 
Page 416 of the record. At trial the issue was litigated. Plaintiff/Appellant failed 
to call any of the physicians to demonstrate relation to the accident or medical 
necessity. Maxine Archuleta admitted on the stand that at least some of the bills 
related to a subsequent injury to her knee and to other illness not related to the 
accident. 
In this case nothing was done to discourage or suggest to plaintiff that she 
not submit bills for PIP benefits. In fact at trial it was demonstrated that the $618 
in bills she did submit were submitted on supporting forms from Hughes office. 
At trial the issue of should bills always be submitted to the PIP carrier was raised 
in the context of trying to settle the hospital bill for less than its face value. At 
trial the issue was litigated as to whether there were conditions under which PIP 
benefits harmed a claimant. The answer was a clear yes and the rationale applies 
here in the context of did Hughes have some duty to submit and collect PIP 
benefits for free. 
The gist of the argument is straight forward. Medical providers such as 
hospitals have an established "usual and customary" charge for each service. 
No one pays that price except people without insurance and those that are 
paying their bills with PIP benefits. Maxine Archuleta had medical insurance 
coverage supervised by a managed care group. The testimony at trial was that 
her managed care paid for services at rates as little as 45% of the "usual and 
customary'7 rate. The plaintiff/appellant would certainly be better off 
submitting her bills to her managed care group. She would have to reimburse 
them just as she would have reimburse the PIP carrier for any benefits paid out 
of the liability settlement but the reimbursement would be only at the rate of 45% 
of the "usual and customary" rate. The PIP carrier is also reimbursed by the 
liability carrier, but at the full "usual and customary" rate. A plaintiff is entitled 
to the benefit of the bargain they have negotiated through their managed care 
supervisor. It is understandable that hospitals would rather be paid at the higher 
rate but it is equally understandable that a plaintiff in a car accident case is better 
off reimbursing medical bills at the rate negotiated by their managed care 
company. 
POINT THREE 
PLAINTIFF'S THIRD ISSUE IS THE REFUSAL TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTION 
ON AGENCY 
From the brief of appellant it is impossible to know what refused 
instruction is being referenced. The instruction is not set out by reference to the 
record nor is it attached. The issue of agency was not presented at trial. In the 
brief there is no act that the plaintiff/appellant points to in the record where a 
claim is made that Bennett did something that was inappropriate. The issue at 
trial was direct and straight forward. Hughes asserted that all of the acts 
involving the representation of this case were his. Anything Bennett did was 
under the direct supervision of Hughes. There was no issue of agency because 
the plaintiff/appellant did not at trial any more than she did in her brief 
demonstrate any failing in the representation by Hughes. The court gave all of 
the MUJI instructions relating to legal malpractice and constructive fraud. It is 
hard to know what instruction is being referenced. 
Plaintiff/ Appellant resorts to ad homonym attack instead of dealing with 
the issue. The appellant's brief asserts that the theme of the defense was "I am 
not Bennett." That could only be asserted by someone who didn't attend the 
trial. The judge is quoted as saying "Bennett is not on trial here/ ' These 
supposed quotes are made without citation or reference. 
There was no defense that if something was done wrong it was Bennett. 
The theme of the defense was blunt, consistent and straight forward. Maxine 
Archuleta retained Don Hughes to represent her in a personal injury action. 
Hughes represented her well and achieved a very favorable result that was more 
than fair and constituted more than complete compensation for her injuries. Any 
assertions to the contrary are false. Hughes stated bluntly at trial and has 
maintained that he was responsible for every aspect of the case and every part of 
the representation. There was no issue of vicarious liability because Hughes 
claimed all of the acts. 
To claim Bennett played a role in the trial is wrong. Neither party called 
Bennett as a witness. Perhaps that is because neither party thought he had much 
to add except in retrospect when plaintiff/appellant's lawyers are searching for a 
reason for their loss at trial and hoping to create and issue on appeal. There 
wasn't evidence at trial that Bennett played any role except under the direct 
supervision of Hughes. There was no evidence that Bennett did anything but 
advance the cause of Maxine Archuleta under the direction of Hughes. 
Plaintiff/Appellant presented no evidence at trial that Bennett did anything that 
was not under the direct supervision of Hughes and done at his insistence. 
The instruction requested by the plaintiff is no where set out in her brief. 
It can only be presumed that the requested instruction being complained of is the 
agency instruction relating to the claim of constructive fraud. Archuleta and her 
lawyers admitted there was no evidence of actual fraud. They claimed a 
tortuously reasoned claim of constructive fraud based on the possible finding by 
the jury that Hughes had breached a fiduciary duty to Archuleta. The judge 
properly ruled that any fiduciary duty was owed by the attorney to his client. 
There was nothing the plaintiff/appellant could point to that Bennett did that 
Hughes did not take credit for. There was no issue of agency because Hughes 
directed all of the representation. 
Bennett was not a party nor a witness nor were any alleged out of court 
statements of his admitted for their purported truth. The court gave all of the 
MUJI instructions on legal malpractice and constructive fraud. These 
instructions more than adequately stated the law. There was no issue of agency 
because plaintiff/appellant never showed anything they claimed Bennett did 
that Hughes did not claim to have done or to have ordered. 
POINT FOUR 
THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT 
TO AUDIT HUGHES TRUST ACCOUNT. 
The uncontested facts were that Hughes settled the liability claim. There 
was a decision to attempt to have the hospital take payment at the rate they 
would receive from her managed care provider. The approximately $1,100 was 
held for this purpose. See paragraph 18 of the affidavit at Page 416 of the record. 
When Maxine Archuleta terminated the attorney client relation the funds held in 
trust were promptly returned to her. There has never been a claim that the full 
funds were not returned nor that they were not returned promptly. 
Plaintiffs attorney was not interested in any legitimate determination of 
the plaintiffs funds, but rather was determined to obtain access to the dates and 
amounts of checks and deposits in the defendant/appellee's trust account. 
Defendant claimed early on this was a frivolous case brought by plaintiffs 
counsel because the defendant/appellee had brought malpractice actions against 
him and for his cooperating with the Office of Attorney Discipline in bringing 
charges for discipline against him. It was the suspicion of defendant/appellee 
that the audit of the trust account was sought to have access to information 
relating to those other cases. 
This discovery request was properly considered by the court and denied. 
There was no claim that Hughes did not hold the funds of plaintiff in trust. They 
were returned to her promptly when requested. She was given a full accounting 
at the time of the settlement. See paragraphs 17,18 and 19 of the affidavit of 
Hughes at Page 416 of the record. Plaintiff made no claim that Hughes did not 
return her the full amount held in trust or that it was not timely paid or that she 
suffered any damage. Her attorney made the claim that there was a potential 
that Hughes did not have the money in trust during the few months (from March 
to July) he represented her after the settlement. Her attorney refused the 
suggestion the court examine the bank records to assure that the funds were 
there. Plaintiffs counsel would only be satisfied with his auditing the bank 
records and having them in his possession. The court properly denied the 
request as not leading to admissible evidence that related to any issue in this 
case. 
The discovery request to essentially audit the trust account of 
defendant/appellee is outrageous. There was no serious request for anything 
that would be admissible at trial. Plaintiff/ Appellant made no claim that 
Hughes failed to return the funds held in trust promptly when she terminated 
the attorney client relation. Her lawyer was not interested in the court 
determining that the funds were always present. His only interest was viewing 
the dates and amounts of checks and deposits. 
An attorney's trust account is subject to the privilege of confidentiality an 
attorney owes his clients. Hughes would have no right to reveal the activity of 
his clients associated with his trust account without a waiver from those clients. 
The request was frivolous and not aimed at obtaining evidence relevant to this 
case. 
POINT FIVE 
THIS IS A FRIVOLOUS APPEAL THAT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
BROUGHT 
Three of the issues raised on appeal are issues concerning summary 
judgment. Plaintiff/Appellant seeks partial summary judgment on a liability 
issue where the establishment of a standard of care by expert opinion is a 
necessary element. No expert opinion as to a standard of care was offered. At 
the full trial of these issues plaintiff/appellant failed to prove the standard of 
care and failed to prove any breach. 
The basic claim in the three issues relating to the plaintiff/appellant's 
motion for partial summary judgment is that an attorney should not take a fee on 
uncontested routine PIP benefits. That is an issue that was never in this case. 
Even Maxine Archuleta admitted on the stand and her trial attorney that no fee 
was taken on any PIP benefits. Plaintiff/appellant's continual return to this issue 
is frivolous. 
The issue of a rejected jury instruction on agency is a frivolous appeal. 
From the brief of appellant/plaintiff it is impossible to even tell what the 
requested instruction was. The argument consists only of supposedly quoted 
characterizations without reference or citation. How can the court evaluate the 
appropriateness of the instruction without even being given what it was. There 
was no agency issue at trial. There is no agency issue on appeal. 
Plaintiff/Appellant failed to show any reason to view defendant's client 
trust account. No claim was ever made that the funds were not promptly 
returned to the plaintiff when the attorney client relation was terminated. This 
was a fishing expedition by plaintiff/appellant's counsel that had nothing to do 
with this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff/Appellant was properly denied her motion for partial summary 
judgment. All three of the issues associated with the motion assume that Hughes 
took a fee on uncontested PIP benefits. That is simply factually wrong. It was 
denied at the summary judgment level and proven false at trial. They make the 
unfounded leap that since plaintiff did collect $618 in PIP benefits that there 
where approximately $2,400 of additional benefits to collect. The brief 
completely ignores the facts before the court at the time the summary judgment 
motion was heard. She submitted some of her bills to her PIP carrier. They paid 
$618 and questioned the medical necessity of the remaining bills and did not pay 
any further. She made no showing in her motion for partial summary judgment 
to show medical necessity or relation to the accident. No further PIP benefits 
were paid and no fee was taken on any PIP benefits. Even at trial she failed to 
call any of the treating physicians to prove what services were rendered or that 
they were necessary or that they related to the accident. 
The affidavit of defendant/appellee clearly and directly controverted the 
claims of Maxine Archuleta. The trier of fact found the facts against her after a 
full trial. How could Judge Dawson or this court find that the material facts were 
uncontested? Judge Dawson reached the proper decision and so did the jury. 
This appeal is frivolous. 
From the brief of appellant it is impossible to know what jury instruction 
they are complaining about. What is worse for them is that if it has to do with 
agency, agency was not an issue in this trial. Hughes took credit for all acts done 
in the course of this representation. There was no claim if errors occurred they 
were someone else's. Every act done Hughes claimed as his own either because 
he did it or directed it. 
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed and the appeal denied 
and declared frivolous. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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